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The systematic distortion hypothesis, which is based on a general cognitive bias 
contention for memory-based ratings of persons, does not account for functional 
differences between different ypes of linguistic form. A distinction between im- 
mediate terms (e.g., verbs, behaviors) and mediate terms (e.g., adjectives, traits) is 
offered. We argue that these linguistic forms fulfill different functions in the de- 
scription of behaviors and persons. The hypothesis that the former terms differentiate 
features of persons in situations and are not affected by conceptual similarity, whereas 
the latter are primarily used to interpret persons and are organized by their conceptual 
relations, is supported in an experimental design in which we varied the type of 
target person orthogonally to type of situation. We show that whereas immediate 
terms differentiated for persons, situations, and persons in situations, their co-oc- 
currence matrices are virtually unaffected by conceptual similarity. A strong con- 
ceptual similarity effect was found for mediate terms. Both sets of findings provide 
support for the functional distinction made between the two linguistic forms, and 
they suggest that the systematic effects produced for the systematic distortion hy- 
pothesis are a function of the types of terms rather than the product of a pervasive 
cognitive bias. The implications of the distinction between different linguistic forms 
for the person-situation debate and rating scale construction are discussed. 
What  is the relationship between the lan- 
guage we use or encounter in the descript ion 
of  behavior and our abil ity to judge the co- 
occurrence of  behaviors as they take place in 
everyday life? This question, which has signif- 
icant impl icat ions for research in personality 
and social psychology, has been brought o the 
fore in recent years with the development and 
disseminat ion of  what has become known as 
the systematic distortion hypothesis (SDH; e.g., 
Shweder & D'Andrade,  1980). 
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According to the systematic distort ion hy- 
pothesis, in its most concisely stated form, 
inferences about personality contain a systematic bias in 
that propositions about "what is like what" are substituted 
for propositions about what is likely, and memory for per- 
sonality relevant events contains asystematic bias in that 
attitudes, affects, and behaviors that are conceptually as- 
sociated . . . are recalled as if they covaried (Shweder, 
1982, p. 66), 
and the predict ion is that 
the correlational structure of variables in rated behavior 
matrices is unlike that of equivalent variables in actual 
behavior matrices, yet replicates the patterning of concep- 
tual association judgments among those same variables in 
conceptual ssociation matrices. (Shweder, 1982, p. 68) 
This contention has been supported by re- 
suits of  a series of  empir ical  studies conducted 
dur ing the past decade (e.g., Shweder, 1975; 
Shweder & D'Andrade,  1980). These studies 
show that memory-based ratings bear a con- 
siderably stronger elation to ratings that are 
based on conceptual or semantic similar ity 
than they do to on-l ine scoring of  actual be- 
havior. 
The systematic distort ion hypothesis is re- 
garded as having significant impl icat ions for 
the study of  personality. Factorial  or c i rcum- 
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plex models of personality are derived largely 
from memory-based procedures such as rating 
scales, questionnaires, interviews, and so on. 
However, a considerable amount of the vari- 
ance contributing to the structural represen- 
tations obtained through such procedures can 
be explained through judgments of the con- 
ceptual or semantic similarity between the 
items that constitute such scales. Shweder 
(1982) therefore argued that the postulation of 
global traits and dispositions as explanatory 
devices may be based on an illusion brought 
about by a cognitive propensity to rely on sim- 
ilarity or conceptual proximity in judgments 
of behavioral co-occurrence. The general con- 
tention that "what is like what" in language is 
confused with "what goes with what" in be- 
havior is constructed by means of drawing 
from the implications of work on human cog- 
nition and applying them to substantive issues 
in personality research (e.g., Shweder, 1977). 
The argument isbased in part on research that 
shows that although human judgmental and 
mnemonic abilities do not conform to the 
canons of logic or statistical probability or both 
(e.g., Nisbett & Ross, 1980; Smedslund, 1963; 
Wason & Johnson-Laird, 1972), their mani- 
festations do display systematicity. Relying on 
the work of Chapman (1967; Chapman & 
Chapman, 1969) and on Tversky and Kahne- 
man's (1974) availability heuristic, Shweder 
(1982) argued that under difficult memory 
conditions, subjects adopt a strategy of gen- 
eralization or recall that implicitly proceeds 
along "pathways of conceptual association 
rather than probabilistic association" (p. 81).1 
The study reported here was derived from 
the contention that proponents of the system- 
atic distortion hypothesis, by resorting to a 
"cognitive propensity" argument, confound a
functional distinction that is linguistically 
given. This distinction is in reference to the 
logically different roles played by different 
terms in describing behaviors and persons, 
which we refer to as immediate and mediate 
terms, respectively. In describing behaviors in 
particular situations, we have access to terms 
(e.g., verbs) that concern concrete descriptions 
of actions and events in a situation. These are 
terms that maintain an immediate reference 
to behavior and that involve classification and 
discrimination of behaviors. In contrast o 
terms with immediate reference, there also ex- 
ist terms (e.g., traits or adjectives) that are more 
abstract in reference and thus detached from 
the immediate here and now of a specific ac- 
tion or event. These are terms that are used in 
the main to describe persons and that maintain 
only a mediate reference to empirical events 
and actions. The important point about such 
terms is that the relations between them are 
established and maintained in language itself. 
Their coherent application is mediated by the 
abstract, semantic, or logical relations implied 
between the terms themselves (cf. Smedslund, 
1982), for which the likeness/unlikeness con- 
tinuum may constitute one mode of relational 
representation. 
This distinction may be illustrated as fol- 
lows: For example, one may classify the fol- 
lowing instances of behavior in a particular 
situation: A person entering a supermarket, 
taking a pack of caviar, putting it into a bag, 
walking to another stand, pocketing another 
object, and so on, until the person walks out, 
smiling to a few customers and bidding fare- 
wellto the cashier after joking with her or him. 
Such discriminations and categorizations of
action are concerned exclusively with the re- 
cording of behavior occurrences. However, the 
application of a mediate term such as dishonest 
to the person in this description would involve 
an interpretation of the observed behaviors 
fulfilling the function of describing the person 
and of distinguishing him or her from other 
persons (i.e., honest persons). Characteristi- 
cally, these terms do not stand in a directly 
definable relation to empirical realities of on- 
going action, and their application ismediated 
through "family resemblances" (cf. Wittgen- 
i The systematic distortion hypothesis incorporates ele- 
ments of longstanding problems in the area o f  rating 
methods, for example, Thorndike's (1920) "halo effect" 
and Newcomb's (1929, 1931) postulate ofa "logical error." 
As a recent review of these studies eems to indicate 
(Cooper, 1980), the detection a d elimination ofthese dif- 
ficulties, particularly the former, are problems that have 
yet to achieve a satisfactory solution. In a more contem- 
porary vein, the systematic distortion hypothesis also 
broaches the questions raised by Passini and Norman's 
(1966) subjects' ability to reproduce a personality factor 
structure on the basis of minimal knowledge oftheir targets 
(cf. also Norman &Goldberg, 1966). More directly relevant 
studies to the systematic distortion hypothesis are those 
by Mulaik (1964) and D'Andrade (1965, 1974), among 
others. 
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stein, 1958); that is, the defining criteria for 
such abstract terms are not particular co-oc- 
currence frequencies of specific behaviors, 
particular intensities, or common features of 
behavior manifestations. The occurrence of a 
behavior such as "Paying" or the knowledge 
that he person is the supermarket owner would 
be sufficient o modify the attribution from 
dishonest to possibly pleasant, charming, or 
friendly. Therefore, such abstract terms main- 
tain only a mediate reference to empirical 
events and actions. Furthermore, honesty, in 
the abstract, is unlikely to be correlated with 
dishonesty, although one and the same person 
may be capable of acting in either fashion. This 
relation does not hold, however, for concrete 
or immediate terms such as verbs; that is, the 
same person may give, take, agree, disagree, 
laugh, and cry within the same episode. 
In short, our argument is the following: If 
one presents ubjects with a rating scale con- 
sisting of immediate terms--that is, concrete 
behavioral items (e.g., walk, take, smile, talk, 
smoke)--and asks them to estimate their rel- 
ative frequency of occurrence in a given situ- 
ation for a particular person, then their task 
consists of extracting from memory quanti- 
tative distinctions. These involve discrimina- 
tions; that is, did a given event occur or not? 
How frequently did it occur? This is primarily 
not a qualitative task. However, if the scale 
consists of mediate terms (e.g., kind, honest, 
outgoing) the demands are different. Instead 
of engaging in absence or presence distinctions 
and estimates of frequency, the subject is asked 
to engage in an interpretative process. In doing 
so, the subject gives judgments that are me- 
diated by logico-semantic mplications, of 
which conceptual similarity between terms is 
just one (cf. Semin & Rosch, 1981; Semin, 
Rosch, & Chassein, 1981). In summary, the 
position adopted here is that the type of lin- 
guistic form that one uses in constructing a 
scale determines in large part whether one will 
obtain results that confirm the systematic dis- 
tortion hypothesis. 
The proponents of the systematic distortion 
hypothesis have not made such a distinction. 
Their position rests on the contention that se- 
mantic similarity affects judgments for both 
mediate and immediate terms. 2
To examine these differences in detail, we 
devised an experimental study in which types 
of situations were varied orthogonally totypes 
of persons. The subjects' task consisted first in 
judging how likely a particular person was to 
manifest each of a series of behaviors (i.e., im- 
mediate terms) in a specific situation. Second, 
they were required to judge how likely the same 
person was to manifest specific qualities (i.e., 
mediate terms) in the same situation. Differ- 
ential hypotheses can be derived from the sys- 
tematic distortion hypothesis and from our 
distinction between immediate and mediate 
terms. According to the systematic distortion 
hypothesis, conceptual similarity effects hould 
influence judgments about frequency or like- 
lihood of occurrence, irrespectively ofwhether 
the judged items are mediate or immediate 
terms. According to our argument, one would 
not expect his to hold for verbs of behavior. 
If verbs are differentially sensitive to events and 
behaviors of persons in concrete situations, 
then one should expect the correlation between 
conceptual similarity judgments between these 
terms and judgments of their co-occurrence 
for a person in a situation to be low. From this 
hypothesis one can also derive a corollary: One 
would expect immediate terms not only to be 
sensitive to behaviors across different situations 
and different types of persons, but also to the 
interaction between situations and persons 
(i.e., persons in situations). 
In the case of mediate terms, however, we 
would expect predicted outcomes from both 
the systematic distortion hypothesis and our 
position to concur; that is, memory-based 
judgments about persons in situations should 
be governed by the conceptual similarities of 
the terms. There should be high correlations 
between mediate term co-occurrences in their 
use and judgments of their conceptual simi- 
larities. Furthermore, as a consequence of their 
2 It may be argued that there are a number of studies 
(e.g., Cooper, 1981; D'Andrade, 1974; Shweder, 1975; 
Shweder & D'Andrade, 1980) which provide support for 
the systematic distortion hypothesis. On closer inspection, 
however, one finds that most of these researchers u ed either 
mediate terms exclusively (e.g., D'Andrade, 1965; Shweder, 
1975) or that they relied on a mixture of the two, using 
both mediate and immediate terms. The only exception 
is a videotape study conducted by D'Andrade and reported 
by Shweder and D'Andrade (1980) and by Shweder (1982). 
However, other researchers u ing a similar research para- 
digm (e.g., Semin & Greenslade, 1984) show results that 
do not support those reported by Shweder and D'Andrade 
(1980). 
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type o f  category, one might  expect  hat, unl ike 
immediate  behav ior  terms,  adjectives hould 
not  differentiate between situations because the 
funct ion o f  these terms is to differentiate be- 
tween persons. Raters '  judgments  should re- 
flect their  knowledge o f  the semant ic  relat ions 
between the i tems in such a way as to mark  
this funct ional  characteristic. Thus  i f  the target 
person is descr ibed,  for example,  as a proto-  
typical  introvert  or a prototypica l  extravert,  
this should inf luence the subsequent  endorse-  
ment  o f  the scales because the impl icat ive fea- 
tures consist o f  b ipolar  opposites (cf. Semin  & 
Rosch, 1981). Th is  wou ld  be expressed in 
te rms o f  di f ferences in average i tem endorse- 
ment  between target persons. However,  it 
should not  affect the extent  o which inter i tem 
relat ions reflect conceptua l  similarity. 
Our  study consisted o f  a 3 × 5 (Persons × 
Situations) between-subjects  factorial  design. 
The  dependent  variables consisted o f  a series 
o f  verbs and adjectives that  were to be judged 
with respect to their  relative l ike l ihood o f  oc- 
currence.  Independently,  conceptual  s imilar ity 
judgments  on the dependent  variables were 
obtained.  
Method  
Participants 
Two hundred fifty-five undergraduate students at the 
University of Mannheim, Mannheim, Federal Republic of 
Germany, participated in this study on a paid voluntary 
basis. Thirty were assigned to the conceptual similarity 
task and the remaining 225 were randomly assigned to 
experimental conditions. They participated ingroups of 5 
to 8 persons. 
Overview 
Each participant received one of 15 booklets. Their task 
was to judge the characteristics and behaviors that a target 
person would manifest in a situation. The first independent 
variable was varied such that each booklet contained a
specific reference to one of five situations (i.e., no specific 
situation, a seminar, a pub, an ice hockey match, and a 
demonstration). We varied the description of the target 
person orthogonally to the situation variable. The target 
person was unspecified with respect o his or her person 
characteristics, was described as a prototypic introvert or 
a prototypic extravert. The design was therefore a 3 × 5 
factorial involving three target person conditions and five 
situation conditions. There were 15 subjects per cell. The 
dependent variables consisted 0f judging the frequency of 
occurrence of each of 10 behaviors for the target in a given 
situation, and judging the applicability of six adjectives to 
the target. 
Procedure 
All participants received abooklet. The cover page con- 
tained the general instructions about the experiment, 
namely, "an examination of the behaviors that people 
manifest in a situation and the characteristics they display." 
They were then provided with a description of the target 
person and a situation in which they were to judge the 
frequency of occurrence of a particular set of behaviors 
and the applicability of a set of attributes. 
Manipulation of  the Target Person 
Participants were given one of three target person de- 
scriptions. A third of the participants received no further 
information aside from a general reference to imagine "a 
person?' Half of the remaining subjects were asked to 
imagine a typical extravert and the remaining halfa typical 
introvert. Both of the latter groups were then provided 
with the description of either type. These descriptions were 
taken from the Eysenck Personality Inventory (EPI) manual 
(Eysenck & Eysenck, 1976). 
Manipulation of  the Situation 
After receiving the general instructions and description 
of the target person, subjects were provided with one of 
five situation conditions. In the no situation condition they 
were asked to judge the frequency of occurrence of the 
behaviors and the applicability of attributes as they would 
be manifested in everyday life. In the remaining four con- 
ditions, they were asked to visualize one of the following 
situations: a pub, a seminar, an ice hockey match, or a 
demonstration, respectively. 
Measures 
After receiving these instructions and descriptions, par- 
ticipants were asked to judge the frequency with which 
each of 10 behaviors were likely to be manifested by the 
target person in the situation. They used a 7-point scale, 
the ends of which were labeled not at allfiequently (!) and 
very frequently (7). These behaviors were as follows: joke, 
criticize, smoke, tease, laugh, agree, show off, disagree, 
dominate, and get excited. Subsequently, subjects received 
six adjectives, which they rated with respect to their ap- 
plicability to the target person in the situation. Again, they 
used a 7-point scale, the ends of which were labeled highly 
inapplicable ( 1) and highly applicable (7). The six adjectives 
were as follows: reserved, lively, talkative, impulsive, sen- 
sitive, and concerned. 
Conceptual Similarity 
Thirty participants were given a booklet containing the 
120 pairwise combinations of the 16 terms in a random 
order. Their task consisted in judging the similarity in 
meaning of each pair on a 10-point scale, the ends of which 
were labeled highly dissimilar in meaning (1) and highly 
similar in meaning (7). 
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Results 
Conceptual Similarity 
The first hypothesis examined concerns the 
predictions that arise from the systematic dis- 
tortion hypothesis and the language-based 
perspective adopted here. To test this hypoth- 
esis, we computed a Pearson product corre- 
lation matrix (i.e., the interitem correlation 
per cell) for each of the 15 cells for both verbs 
and adjectives. Each of these two sets of 15 co- 
occurrence matrices were then correlated with 
the respective average conceptual similarity 
matrix (i.e., the verb or adjective matrix). 3This 
involves correlating between-item co-occur- 
rences (rs), obtained seperately for each 
cell, with between-item conceptual similarity 
(mean similarity between item pairs obtained 
on the basis of conceptual similarity judg- 
ments). As one can see from Table 1, the av- 
erage correlation between the conceptual sim- 
ilarity matrix and the behavior co-occurrence 
matrices was .24 (obtained through z trans- 
formation of the 15 rs for behaviors in Table 
1) and was never higher than .52. In contrast, 
the correlations for the mediate terms are with 
one exception all above .53 with an average 
correlation of .83 (obtained through z trans- 
formation of the 15 rs for adjectives in Table 
1). This distinctive pattern of correlations for 
verbs and adjectives trongly underlines the 
distinction that is introduced between imme- 
diate and mediate terms and the argument 
about their differential functions in the de- 
scription of persons and behaviors. 
Differential Sensitivity of Immediate and 
Mediate Terms to Situations and Persons 
To examine the differential sensitivity of the 
two linguistic forms to contextual variables 
(i.e., Persons, Situations, and Persons × Situ- 
ations), we conducted two multivariate anal- 
yses of variance (MANOVAS). The first analysis 
was carried out with the verbs. As expected, 
the multivariate main effect for the target per- 
son factor was significant, F(20, 402) = 29.03, 
p < .0001, as well as were the multivariate 
main effect for situations, /7(40, 764.02) = 
4.06, p < .0001, and the Target Person × Sit- 
uations interaction, F(80, 1283,40) = 1.86, p < 
.0001. The univariate ffects (of. Table 2) sug- 
Table 1 
Correlations Between the Conceptual Similarity 
Matrix and the Co-occurrence Matrices for 
Behaviors and Adjectives 
Situation 
Target Person 
Unspecified Extraverted Introverted 
Behaviors 
Unspecified .07 .21 . ! 7 
Pub .52 .20 .26 
Seminar -.04 .24 .20 
Ice hockey .36 .40 .20 
Demonstration .36 .17 .34 
Adjectives 
Unspecified .36 .77 .58 
Pub .89 .88 .92 
Seminar .93 .94 .93 
Ice hockey .73 .91 .69 
Demonstration .53 .63 .93 
gest that for the target person factor, all verbs 
except agree were significant. In the case of 
the situation factor, all the univariate main ef- 
fects except agree and disagree reached sig- 
nificance. Of the univariate interaction terms, 
five were significant (joke, laugh, show off, dis- 
agree, and get excited). The remaining five 
verbs showed tendencies in the expected i- 
rection, the lowest F(8, 210) being 1.51, p < 
.16, and the highest being 1.86, with the re- 
spective p range being <.  16 and > .07. 
The MANOVA for the adjectives revealed a
significant main effect for the target person 
factor, F(12, 410) -- 12.28, p < .0001; all the 
univariate ffects reached significance (cf. Ta- 
ble 2). The multivariate situation effect was 
not significant, F(24, 716.37)= 1.33. The 
multivariate interaction term reached signifi- 
cance, F(48, 1012.75) = 1.59, p < .0 l, whereby 
the univariate analyses for reserved and lively 
yielded the only significant terms. 4The means 
s Whether the overlap between conceptual nd co-oc- 
currence matrices was calculated via Pearson product- 
moment correlations or via nonparametric rank order cor- 
relations did not make anotable difference. The correla- 
tions reported in Table 1 are based on Pearson product- 
moment correlations. 
4 The directions ofthe univariate effects are not discussed 
in any detail for two reasons. First, they are in the direction 
one would expect by common sense. More important, 
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Table 2 
Univariate Effects for Behaviors and Adjectives 
Effect type 
Person X 
Dependent Person, Situation, Situation, 
Variables /7(2, 210) F(4, 210) F(8, 210) 
Behaviors 
Joke 200.46*** 4.30*** 3.02*** 
Criticize 9.66*** 6.87*** 1.83" 
Smoke 32.13*** 9.34*** 1.86* 
Tease 84.69*** 4.76*** 1.51 
Laugh 155.29*** 7,90*** 4.58*** 
Agree 0.22 1.47 1.68 
Show off 90.65*** 3.24** 2.05** 
Disagree 18.21"** 0.75 2.23** 
Dominate 78.40*** 6.63*** 1.79" 
Get excited 124.90"** 9.09*** 2.68*** 
Adjectives 
Reserved 73.50*** 3.24** 3.15"** 
Lively 62.69*** 0.49 2.25** 
Talkative 32.23*** 0.54 1.09 
Impulsive 32.17*** 0.31 1.30 
Sensitive 9.40*** 1.34 1.11 
Concerned 11.52"** 0.38 1.63 
*p < .10. ** p < .05. *** p < .01. 
and standard eviations for both verbs and ad- 
jectives for the complete design are provided 
in Tables 3 and 4. 
An additional statistical index for the pro- 
posed effects can be obtained by calculating 
the respective ta for the multivariate terms. 
Eta squared is a measure approximating 
amount of variance xplained (cf. Moosbrug- 
ger, 1978; Tatsuoka, 1971). A comparison of 
n2 for the different erms of the multivariate 
analysis for adjectives and behaviors is com- 
plicated by the fact that the number of depen- 
dent variables that go into the analyses are dif- 
ferent. To obtain some comparability, we 
would have to reduce the number of dependent 
variables for the analysis with the immediate 
terms from 10 to 6. To ensure this, we ran 
multivariate analyses for all combinations of 
six immediate terms. This provided a range of 
however, is the second reason: namely, that the hypothesis 
derived from the language-based perspective is predictive 
of differences for the multivariate rms (main effects and 
interaction) between mediate and immediate terms but 
does not provide any specific ontent-based differentiations 
as such. 
minimum and maximum n2. A comparison of 
the ~2 for immediate and mediate terms, re- 
spectively, for the person main effect (.7420 < 
n 2 < .7950 vs. ~2 = .4588), the situation main 
effect (.3403 < ~2 < .4360 vs. ~2 = .141 l) and 
the Person × Situation interaction (.3419 < 
17 2 < .4220 vs. 7/2 = .3002) supports the con- 
tention that the effects for immediate terms 
explain a higher proportion of variance than 
effects for mediate terms. 
In contrast, conceptual similarity accounts 
for a considerably larger amount of the vari- 
ance of the average mediate term co-occur- 
rence matrix (r 2 = .69) than of the average 
immediate term co-occurrence matrix (r 2 = 
.06). These results also indicate support for 
the language-based hypothesis. 
These findings uggest that immediate terms 
allow a differentiation between persons, situ- 
ations, and their particular compositions, 
which supports the predictions advanced in 
the introduction. Mediate terms allow in the 
main differentiations between persons, again 
as predicted; however, some appear to differ- 
entiate for specific onstellations ofpersons in 
situations as well. 
Discussion 
The results of our experiment support he 
postulated ifferences between mediate and 
immediate terms in the description of persons 
and their behaviors. The results indicate that 
whereas the adjective co-occurrences in the 
description of persons in situations were highly 
correlated with their similarity in meaning, this 
was not the case for verbs. Conceptual simi- 
larity accounts for a minimal amount of the 
variance of the behavior co-occurrence matrix 
in any of the 15 cells. Furthermore, it is also 
shown that immediate, behavior terms allow 
differentiation of actions as a function of the 
person and the situation. In the case of mediate 
terms we find that attribute co-occurrences are 
largely accounted for by similarity in meaning 
and that such terms allow differentiation be- 
tween persons with ease, but not for situations 
or for persons in situations. 
These results suggest a narrowing down of 
the broader purview of the systematic distor- 
tion hypothesis in at least two respects. The 
first concerns the extent o which the system- 
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atic distortion effect may be said to reflect a 
general, underlying cognitive process or ten- 
dency. This is expressed in the contention that 
memory-based judgments are systematically 
distorted by the confusion of propositions 
about likelihood with propositions about like- 
Table 3 
Mean Judgments and Standard Deviations for Behaviors (Full Design) 
Situation Joke Criticize Smoke Tease Laugh Agree Show off Disagree Dominate Get excited 
Unspecified targetperson 
Unspecified 
M 4.47 4.33 5.40 4.53 4.27 4.80 4.93 3.40 4.88 5.53 
SD 1.19 1.83 1.60 1.25 1.34 1.57 1.22 1.24 1.06 1.19 
Pub 
M 5.20 3.87 5.07 3.67 6.07 4.13 4.33 4.27 4.20 4.13 
SD 1.01 1.30 1.58 1.54 0.70 1.24 1.45 0.96 1.21 1.69 
Seminar 
M 3.60 4.13 2.27 2.47 3.87 4.20 2.60 4.07 3.27 3.67 
SD 1.55 1.55 1.83 1.64 1.13 1.15 1.55 1.58 1.75 1.92 
Ice Hockey 
M 3.40 6.33 4.47 4.87 3.67 3.40 3.87 4.80 3.93 6.40 
SD 2.13 0.72 1.92 1.36 1.92 1.55 2.13 1.27 1.71 0.83 
Demonstration 
M 3.80 5.40 4.53 4.27 3.60 4.13 3.47 4.67 3.73 5.80 
SD i.47 0.99 1.36 1.75 1.18 1.81 1.73 1.23 1.49 0.68 
Extravert 
Unspecified 
M 6.47 4.80 5.53 5.00 6.40 3.73 4.40 4.80 5.60 5.60 
SD 0.52 1.66 0.92 1.19 0.91 1.03 1.54 1.21 1.18 1.24 
Pub 
M 6.27 3.67 5.47 4.87 6.53 4.07 4.87 4.47 5.47 5.07 
SD 0.59 1.40 1.46 1.96 0.52 1.39 1.51 1.55 1.46 1.28 
Seminar 
M 5.60 4.47 4.07 4.53 6.27 4.27 4.27 4.60 5.07 5.40 
SD 0.99 1.51 1.49 1.19 0.80 1.03 1.34 1.30 1.10 1.24 
Ice Hockey 
M 5.60 5.20 4.47 4.67 5.53 4.33 4.40 4.67 5.13 6.27 
SD 1.05 2.00 1.68 1.80 1.18 1.68 1.64 1.59 1.36 1.22 
Demonstration 
M 5.20 4.13 5.27 4.67 5.33 4.33 4.80 3.93 4.87 5.53 
SD 1.57 1.55 0.96 1.40 1.35 1.63 1.37 1.22 1.46 1.25 
Introvert 
Unspecified 
M 2.13 4.20 2.87 2.13 3.13 4.33 2.06 3.67 3.87 3.07 
SD 0.63 1.52 1.92 1.36 0.83 1.11 1.38 1.11 1.96 1.44 
Pub 
M 1.53 3.07 3.00 1.53 2.53 4.67 1.27 2.60 1.47 2.00 
SD 0.64 1.58 1.13 1.30 1.06 1.68 0.46 1.21 0.74 1.25 
Seminar 
M 1.47 3.60 2.33 1.27 2.13 4.13 1.47 3.47 2.27 1.93 
SD 0.64 0.99 1.76 0.46 0.74 0.91 1.06 0.99 1.03 1.16 
Ice Hockey 
M 2.33 3.87 3.00 2.00 3.07 3.40 1.40 3.27 2.60 2.27 
SD I. 11 1.72 1.77 1.25 1.28 0.83 0.63 1.22 !.72 1.71 
Demonstration 
M 2.20 4.00 3.60 2.07 2.60 3.53 1.80 3.40 i.73 2.53 
SD i.47 1.77 1.64 1.49 1.55 1.36 1.08 !.64 !.10 1.55 
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ness (e.g., D'Andrade, 1974; Shweder, 1977; 
Shweder & D'Andrade, 1980). The second 
point concerns the broad and generic appli- 
cation of the notion of conceptual similarity 
or semantic similarity. 
Our findings suggest hat the nature of the 
correlations between behavior co-occurrence 
matrices and conceptual similarity matrices 
depend largely on the type of linguistic terms 
used. Thus concrete and discrete terms such 
Table 4 
Mean Judgments and Standard Deviations for Adjectives (Full Design) 
Situation Reserved Lively Talkative Impulsive Sensitive Concerned 
Unspecified target person 
Unspecified 
M 2.60 4.47 3.67 4.33 3.53 4.27 
SD 0.73 1.13 1.18 1.63 2.03 1.58 
Pub 
M 5.13 3.53 2.93 2.93 4.87 4.47 
SD 1.06 1.18 1.71 1.22 1.36 1.69 
Seminar 
M 3.26 3.80 4.13 3.53 3.80 3.60 
SD 1.83 1.37 1.60 1.30 1.70 1.92 
Ice hockey 
M 5.40 2.40 3.40 2.67 4.60 4.40 
SO 1.72 1.68 1.45 1.83 2.13 1.96 
Demonstration 
M 4.53 3.67 3.40 3.53 3.40 3.47 
SD 1.30 1.50 1.68 1.80 1.06 1.92 
Extravert 
Unspecified 
M 5.60 2.40 2.53 2.53 3.66 4.60 
SD 2.13 2.26 2.23 2.35 !.87 1.68 
Pub 
M 5.67 2.53 2.47 3.07 4.00 4.87 
SD 1.84 1.96 2.23 2.12 1.36 1.99 
Seminar 
M 5.33 2.47 2.40 2.53 3.47 5.07 
SD 1.44 1.25 1.30 1.55 1.24 1.49 
Ice hockey 
M 5.13 2.13 2.47 2.13 4.53 3.60 
SD 2.33 1.85 1.77 2.07 !.64 1.88 
Demonstration 
M 5.86 2.27 2.33 2.20 4.33 5.07 
SD 0.83 1.62 1.44 1.57 1.29 1.22 
Introvert 
Unspecified 
M 2.60 4.53 3.67 4.33 2.80 3.13 
SD 1.81 2.23 1.68 2.61 2.11 !.64 
Pub 
M 2.47 5.13 5.07 5.07 2.73 3.00 
SD 2.26 3.89 1.58 2.71 1.83 1.77 
Seminar 
M 1.80 5.73 4.87 5.53 3.27 3.87 
SD 1.32 1.83 1.46 2.26 1.98 1.80 
Ice Hockey 
M 1.93 6.06 4.67 5.47 3.07 3.40 
SD 1.03 1.10 1.59 1.99 1.58 1.64 
Demonstration 
M 2.67 5.80 4.80 5.00 3.07 3.07 
SD 1.80 1.47 1.61 2.29 1.62 1.43 
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as verbs that refer to specific actions allow dis- 
criminative judgments about the behaviors 
that persons manifest in situations. Although 
we do not present an examination of ongoing 
behavior in the flow of everyday life, the fact 
that raters engage in differential recall of com- 
plex behavior contingencies as a function of 
the person and the situation suggests that such 
terms permit discriminations in terms of like- 
lihood and not likeness. More abstract and 
mediate concepts such as adjectives, we argue, 
are organized around semantic or logical re- 
lations implied between them and fulfill the 
function of describing the person interpreta- 
tively. The correlations obtained between the 
adjective co-occurrence matrices and the con- 
ceptual similarity matrix suggest that adjective 
ratings are largely guided by linguistic propo- 
sitions (i.e., semantic considerations). The 
contrasting findings with respect to verbs and 
adjectives suggest that the types of results gen- 
eraUy obtained in studies that show the sys- 
tematic distortion effect need not be explained 
by reference to a generic ognitive process or 
tendency, but by constraints imposed by the 
linguistic forms used in such studies. Indeed, 
a careful examination of those studies that are 
regarded as supporting the systematic distor- 
tion hypothesis ndicates that with one excep- 
tion (a videotape study conducted by D'An- 
drade and reported briefly by Shweder & 
D'Andrade, 1980, and by Shweder, 1982) all 
of the researchers relied on either mediate 
terms exclusively or, at best, a mixture of me- 
diate and immediate terms. 
The second aspect concerns the ambiguity 
surrounding the notion of similarity in mean- 
ing. As Block, Weiss, and Thorne (1979) ar- 
gued, this term has been used without "con- 
sideration and articulation" (p. 1071). Gara 
and Rosenberg (1981) reported a study in 
which they attempted to clarify whether se- 
mantic similarity judgments merely reflect 
linguistic factors or also contain beliefs about 
trait co-occurrence. To examine this, they 
adopted Tversky's (1977) notion of shared 
features and devised an index for its measure- 
ment. Their results suggested that "meaning 
similarity contains two components: hared 
features and perceived co-occurrence" (Gara 
& Rosenberg, 1981, p. 450). However, in this 
work they relied completely on mediate terms 
(i.e., adjectives as trait terms). Our findings al- 
low a different delineation of the notion of 
similarity in meaning, namely, its range of 
sensible applicability as a function of the lin- 
guistic forms that are used in rating scales. The 
reported findings demonstrate quite clearly 
that whereas co-occurrences among adjectives 
in memory-based judgments of persons are 
largely predictable from ratings of the same 
adjectives in terms of their similarity in mean- 
ing, this does not apply to co-occurrences 
among behaviors. Thus, in the description of 
persons, the respective roles of verbs and ad- 
jectives are characterized by differences in 
function, and the idea of semantic similarity 
can only be regarded as applicable to adjectives 
to the extent hat the relations between such 
terms are mediated by abstract linguistic on- 
vention, whereas concrete terms fulfill dis- 
criminatory functions. 
The implications of this conclusion for the 
systematic distortion hypothesis are twofold. 
First, it raises questions about he validity of 
a central assumption underlying the hypoth- 
esis: namely, that behavior co-occurrences are 
mediated largely by similarity in meaning and, 
by implication, by the assumption that trait 
terms (e.g., adjectives) consist merely of spe- 
cific behavior co-occurrence patterns. Our re- 
suits suggest that this central assumption is not 
supported. Furthermore, as mentioned earlier, 
most researchers examining the systematic 
distortion hypothesis use mediate terms or a 
mixture of mediate and immediate terms. In 
addition, there is evidence that suggests that 
memory-based judgments of ongoing behavior 
in a real-life episode, in which only immediate 
terms are used, correlate highly with behavior 
co-occurrences (cf. Semin & Greenslade, 1984) 
and are negligibly correlated with similarity in 
meaning. 
The more speculative implications of these 
findings concern the question of the relation 
between behavior co-occurrences and their 
adjectival descriptions. Obviously, as Block et 
al. (1979) argued, "'the use of frequency counts 
of behavior is not a sufficient means of oper- 
ationalizing complex psychological variables" 
(p. 1060). That traits or adjectives are quali- 
tative and interpretative comments on ongoing 
behavior has been argued before. However, the 
differential sensitivity of the two linguistic 
forms to parameters of ongoing behavior, as 
illustrated in our study, suggests that in ful- 
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filling different functions these terms also allow 
observers to focus attention on different aspects 
of  ongoing behavior. Immediate behavior 
terms differentiate as a function of  the situa- 
tional and personal parameters of  ongoing ac- 
tion, whereas mediate person-descriptive 
terms, although sensitive to person parameters, 
are more crude with respect to their differential 
sensitivity to persons in situations. What is 
more important is that although mediate terms 
are not applied in a differential manner to re- 
flect the features of  events, they contain a sys- 
tematicity that is provided by their semantic 
interrelations, which explains a larger propor- 
tion of  their variance than do situational or 
personal features of  an event. These consid- 
erations may provide a possible explanation of  
the structural differences that Buss and Craik 
(1983a) found in their analysis, in which they 
compared their act frequency approach to 
personality with the Wiggins (1979) circum- 
plex model of  interpersonal dispositions. 
Whereas with the former one relies on acts, 
which may be regarded as falling in the cate- 
gory of  immediate terms, the latter involves 
reliance on adjectives. Systematic relations 
such as bipolar relations in the Wiggins (1979) 
model are likely to be mediated by the seman- 
tic relations between the adjectives, whereas 
the structure of  act frequencies appear to be 
independent of  such influences. That one is 
able to use both forms raises a theoretically 
and empirically interesting question: namely, 
how is the link between these two forms of 
terms established? If this link is mediated by, 
for example, family resemblances, then it may 
prove difficult to uncover systematic empirical 
effects. The program developed by Buss and 
Craik (1983b) may indeed provide a possible 
solution to this problem. 
Lastly, our findings have implications for 
questionnaire construction in general. The 
formulation of  questions with mediate or im- 
mediate terms should produce effects that, 
from a theoretical point of  view, have impli- 
cations above and beyond the immediate ob- 
jectives of  the instrument's design. This may 
have important bearings on issues such as the 
prediction of  behavior from the assessment of  
attitudes or of  traits. Our perspective may thus 
also have implications for the person-situation 
debate. Whatever the varied implications, our 
main conclusion is that the proponents of  the 
systematic distortion hypothesis appear to have 
confused propositions about semantic relations 
with propositions about cognitive processes. 
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